

Problem: If being an abstract (= property = object) is itself an abstract (= property = object)—more specifically, a disjunctive transcendental abstract (= property = object)—what does it belong to, make a difference to, or characterize? If an abstract (= property = object) is only that, it is not the kind of thing that anything else can belong to, make a difference to, or characterize. But, then, how can the disjunctive transcendental abstract (= property = object) of being an abstract (= property = object) belong to it, make a difference to it, or characterize it?

Solution: Transcendental abstracts (= properties = objects), both convertible and disjunctive, belong to, make a difference to, or characterize other abstracts (= properties = objects) only insofar as they belong to, make a difference to, or characterize the concretes (= instances = subjects) that the abstracts (= properties = objects) themselves belong to, make a difference to, or characterize. Thus, for example, the convertible abstract (= property = object) of being real belongs to, makes a difference to, or characterizes an abstract (= property = object), be it transcendental, categorial, generic, specific, or individual, only insofar as it belongs to, makes a difference to, or characterizes the concrete (= instance = subject) that the abstract (= property = object) itself belongs to, makes a difference to, or characterizes. On the other hand, the disjunctive transcendental abstract (= property = object) of being an abstract (= property = object), as distinct from a concrete (= instance = subject), belongs to, makes a difference to, or characterizes an abstract (= property = object) only insofar as the disjunctive transcendental abstract (= property = object) of being a concrete (= instance = subject) belongs to, makes a difference to, or characterizes some concrete (= instance = subject).

n.d.; rev. 12 April 1997; 6 August 2002