

I have spoken variously of “ultimate subject[s] of predication,” “ultimate subject[s] of statements capable of being true or false,” and “ultimate subject[s] of discourse.”

Hartshorne also speaks variously, and yet means the same thing, I believe, of “entities on the first logical level, values of the variables for ‘individuals,’” “first-level entities,” “concrete entities as such (from which all abstract entities in some fashion derive).”

Hartshorne recognizes, actually, that first-level entities in a particular context need not be fully concrete, such things as ordinary genetically identical individuals and even numbers sometimes figuring as such in certain contexts. Strictly speaking, however, “concrete entities as such,” in the Aristotelian-Whiteheadian sense of “complete facts,” or “fully existing” entities, can only be the strictly identical individuals that Whitehead distinguishes as “actual occasions,” or “actual entities,” and that I, following Hartshorne, call “events.”

23 January 1998; rev. 23 July 2002