

I wrote some years ago, that "such knowledge as we can have of the inner nature of anything else we can have only by way of analogy with whatever we are able to know of our own existence." During the intervening years, I found good reasons to reject such a statement insofar as it is construed as I almost certainly construed it in making it. My question, then, is whether this is the only way to construe it, or whether it bears some other construction in which it can and should still be made. I have two comments.

1. It seems clear, as I have pointed out elsewhere (e.g., Notebooks, 22 September 2004), that, aside from ordinary, dictionary uses of "analogy," the term has and must have proper uses even in an austere transcendental metaphysics. Take the term "real," for example. If abstracts are properly said to be as real as concretes, then, assuming the logical-ontological type difference between abstracts and concretes, "real" as used of both of them must be used analogically. This is so, at any rate, provided it is not used merely equivocally, since, given the type difference between abstracts and concretes, it cannot be used univocally. And so, too, with the terms "abstracts" and "concretes," both of which, like "real," are applicable across fundamental differences of logical-ontological type. In the case of "abstracts," there are not only the differences between the various types of categorial properties—i. e., categories, genera, species, and individualities—but also the differences between all of them, on the one hand, and the unique type of transcendental properties, on the other. Similarly, in the case of "concretes," there are not only the type differences between events, individuals, and aggregates, but also the unique type differences between any particular individual and the one universal individual, which can only be transcendental differences.

2. A precedent for defining the alternative construction of my statement is how I have long since defined alternative ways of construing certain parallel statements of Whitehead's and Hartshorne's. I refer to such statements of Whitehead's as that "all final individual actualities have the metaphysical character of occasions of experience" (*AI*: 284), or that "the whole universe consists of elements disclosed in the analysis of the experiences of subjects" (*PRc*: 166 [252]). As I have previously explained (Notebooks, 21 October 2000), my issue is not with these statements as such, but with one of the possible ways in which they're construed—specifically,

with how the term "metaphysical character" in the first statement and the term "elements" in the second, are understood. If "metaphysical character" includes "experience" in some intelligible sense of the word, as Whitehead himself presumably thinks, then I can only reject his statement, arguing instead that it includes only the "concreteness" of which "experience" as we experience our own is (admittedly!) a special case. Or, again, if the "elements" disclosed in the analysis of experience include "experience" in some intelligible sense or other, as Whitehead appears to hold, then I have to reject the statement, arguing, on the contrary, that what is "elemental" in the experiences of subjects is not their experience, but simply their concreteness, their being instances of concrescence, and so on.

*Mutatis mutandis*, I can reasonably construe my statement above so that I can still make it. The issue in its case is what is to be understood by "inner nature" and "analogy." Since the only inner nature of anything to which we are privy is our own, it's truistic to say that any knowledge we can have of the inner nature of anything else is by analogy with it. But, again, what is meant by, or included in, "inner nature"? If it's equivalent to "metaphysical character," then the issue is the same as has been clarified under 2 above, and I have to resolve it accordingly. As for "analogy," I have good reason to allow, as I've argued under 1 above, that even "metaphysical character" is an analogical concept, in that, e.g., such metaphysical knowledge as I can have of the universal individual can only be by analogy with such metaphysical knowledge as I can have of myself as a particular individual.

Of course, "inner nature," as I would use the term, includes but is not exhausted by "metaphysical character." So there may well be any number of other merely factual, nonmetaphysical things that I can know about the inner nature of things other than myself by analogy with myself. But in no case can I make or imply a legitimate claim to such knowledge where I cannot give an intelligible sense to the terms employed in the analogy—as I clearly cannot in the case where "experience" is supposedly used analogically with a claim to know the "metaphysical character" of things.