

“[T]he idea that God’s existence could be just another case of existence in general has *always* been a failure to comprehend theism. . . . [I]t is blasphemous to think of God as merely an additional fact, however great, merely one side of a significant alternative, rather than as the soul of factuality itself and the very basis of all alternativeness, the potential registrant of whatever value or importance *either* side of any disjunction can have, hence not subject to intelligible denial” (AD: 146, 148).

Thus we have the traditional statements that God “transcends the categories,” which cannot be applied “univocally” to God, and that God “does not have but *is* God’s being or goodness.” In other words, the nature of God is not a universal property capable of being embodied in this, that, or the other individual. On the contrary, the unique excellence of God necessarily implies a logical-ontological type difference from all other individuals, actual or possible.

On the other hand, “[a] sole example is not a supreme example. . . . We do not exalt God by giving [God] a unique category, like creative power, for [God’s] very own. . . . The unsurpassable power of God should be the supreme form of ‘power’ in the general sense, exhibited elsewhere in inferior degrees or ‘resemblances’” (195; cf. 67). “[T]he supreme must not be the sole form of a category” (196).

Thus we must say such things as, “God has the supreme form of creativity, creatures have lesser forms” (197). “[I]f supreme reality consists in supreme creativity . . . , then lesser realities must be lesser—but not zero—forms of such creativity” (207). God’s is not the sole creativity, but rather “the self-surpassable, otherwise unsurpassable Creativity” (218).

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