

Presupposed by any meaning and any kind of meaning are certain necessary conditions of possibility: of the possibility of human existence as the being that is capable both of understanding and expressing all kinds of meaning and of critically appropriating all such understandings and expressions; and of the possibility of anything whatsoever as the being that any meaning and any kind of meaning must somehow be about—indirectly if not directly.

If the necessary, absolutely speaking, is rightly defined as what is common to, or the least common denominator of, *all* possibilities, or what is bound to happen, no matter what possibility is actualized, the necessary, relatively speaking, may be defined as what is common to, or the least common denominator of, *some set of* possibilities, or what is bound to happen, no matter which possibility in the set is actualized. The necessary, then, speaking relatively to human existence as understanding existence, may be defined as what is common to, or the least common denominator of, the set of possibilities belonging to such existence, or what is bound to happen, no matter which of its possibilities is actualized.

Let the necessary, absolutely speaking, be called "the transcendental," or "transcendentality," and the necessary, speaking relatively to human existence—not as existence *simpliciter*, but as *understanding* existence—"the existential (in the emphatic sense)," or "existentiality" (Heidegger).

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