

When Hartshorne talks about philosophy in relation to wisdom, he sometimes talks as though philosophy simply *were* "[t]he inclusive human wisdom" (*PCH*: 636). I should think, however, that philosophy is better spoken of as clearly distinct from wisdom—namely, as the *love of wisdom*, or, better, perhaps, the *search for*, or the *study that seeks*, wisdom, wisdom itself, then, being understood as authentic self-understanding, or authentic understanding of existence.

An advantage of this alternative way of speaking is that one then no longer needs to say or imply, as Hartshorne does, that philosophy itself "is to some extent irreducibly intuitive and personal"—wherewith he contradicts his other statements that philosophy aspires to "impersonal truth" and that the philosopher, accordingly, is "not the final arbiter, rather the clarifier or intellectual explorer, of belief possibilities." What is rightly said to be irreducibly intuitive and personal is not philosophy, but the wisdom, the authentic self-understanding, of which philosophy is the love, or for which it is the search.

In other places, Hartshorne himself can speak in just this alternative way—as when he says, for example, that "[p]hilosophers seek wisdom" and that "wisdom implies both knowledge and a right sense of values" ("The Nature of Philosophy": 7).

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