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In at least one place, I distinguish religion from philosophy because religion is a primary form of culture, while philosophy, like theology, is a secondary form (cf. *Is There Only One True Religion . . . ?*: 8 f.). Elsewhere, however, I also allow that neither philosophy nor theology is simply a secondary rather than a primary form of culture because both may have "precritical" as well as properly "critical" forms (cf. 13 August 1999). But, clearly, allowing this denies by implication at least one of the reasons I give for holding that religion and philosophy are distinct.

In other places, however, I rely on another more fundamental reason—"more fundamental" because it in no way loses its force even when one allows that there are "precritical" as well as "critical" forms of philosophy as well as theology. Thus, following Whitehead, I insist, in my own way, that religion "arises from that which is special, but it extends to what is general," or, as I might better put it here, that although religion extends to what is general, it arises from that which is particular (*On Theology*: 3). Consistently with this, then, I also maintain that the doctrines of religion "have their origin in a quite particular occasion of insight or 'special revelation'" and that "a religion . . . has its origin and principle in some particular occasion of insight, be it 'hierophany' or 'revelation,'" correlative with which is "a particular form of faith, or understanding of existence, which in turn provides the foundation for a whole symbolic structure of beliefs, rites, and social organizations" (79, 110; cf. 85). In the same vein, I also argue—even, indeed, in *Is There Only One True Religion . . . ?!*—that "the term 'religion' by its very meaning always has an objective as well as a subjective reference," in that it is "not only the explicit understanding *through* which our existence is understood," but "also the explicit understanding which *is* understood as and when we so understand ourselves" (10). In this connection, then, I also argue that "[i]n the specific case of Christianity, . . . this explicit understanding [*sc.* of existence] is not, in the first instance, some law or teaching or word of wisdom, but Jesus himself, through whom the meaning of ultimate reality for us is decisively re-presented" (97).

In short, I consistently recognize that, whereas philosophy is constituted solely and simply by *human* existence, religion is always constituted by specifically *Christian* (or Buddhist, or Muslim, or . . . )

existence—or, as I sometime say, by a "correlation" between human existence, on the one hand, and some special revelation that claims to be decisive for it, on the other (cf., e.g., *On Theology*: 3, 20 f., 93). And this, of course, explains why I distinguish clearly and sharply between two types of constructive theology: theology in the sense of "philosophical theology"; and "theology in the generic sense," which includes "theology in the specific sense of 'Christian theology.'" Whereas "human existence simply as such" is sufficient to constitute philosophical theology, also necessary to constitute theology in the generic sense is "the claim of some specific religion or other to decisive authority." In this sense, I say, "if the thought and speech distinctive of religions generally are the privileged data of both types of constructive theology, this second type is distinguished from the first by having, as it were, twice-privileged data in what is thought and said by some one specific religion in advancing its claim to decisive authority and truth" (126 f.).

This, then, is the most fundamental reason why philosophy and religion are to be distinguished. Whereas the first is already constituted in principle by the *original* revelation accessible to human existence simply as such, the second is constituted thanks only to some *special* revelation that claims to be *decisive* revelation—because, namely, it is decisive for human existence and thus also for deciding between all other special revelations.

15 December 2003