

It's worth keeping in mind that the use of such terms as "quasi-religions," or "religion surrogates," assumes that real religion, or religion proper, can only be what I would call, more exactly, "*axial* religion."

Does this mean, then, that, as I have often said, such usage assumes "a nonfunctional, or substantive [= a nonformal, or material], understanding" of "religion"? Yes, it does, insofar as the distinction between "archaic" and "axial" religions is itself not a functional, or formal, but rather a substantive, or material, distinction. But saying that it is is tricky, insofar as it is a substantive, or material, distinction *at a different (higher) level* than the substantive, or material, distinctions that require to be made between different axial (and also, perhaps, archaic) religions themselves. In this sense, the functional/substantive, or formal/material, distinction may be used both absolutely and relatively.

The same is true, presumably, of Santayana's distinction between "natural" and "ultimate" religions, as well as other similar, or parallel, distinctions such as Whitehead's between "social" and "rational" religion.

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