"It is inappropriate to ask '*Why* is $2 + 2 = 4$?', but not simply because this equality is uncaused; rather, because it is neither caused nor conceptually contingent. The sum of 2 and 2 could not but be 4; hence, there need be no explanation—other than this strict necessity—of why it is not other than 4. But suppose an uncaused God to exist, though [God's] nonexistence was also possible. Then we have a sheer, absolutely inexplicable fact. It cannot be explained as necessary; it cannot be explained causally; it is an absolutely irrational fact, yet one upon which all other facts depend. But if this is allowed, why set any limits at all to the inexplicability of fact? Is there no absurdity in the supposition? To a theist it looks like the very apotheosis of absurdity. . . . [O]nly the conceptually necessary can reasonably be viewed as uncaused, and only the conceivably caused can reasonably be viewed as conceptually contingent. It would, to be sure, follow that the laws of nature, if conceptually contingent, as they seem to be, must be caused, but this a theist must suppose anyway. . . . [N]o absurdity follows from the identification of 'not conceivably caused' with 'conceptually necessary,' unless theism itself is absurd" ("Is the Denial of Existence Ever Contradictory?": 89)