

I have allowed that a distinction is to be made between the strict and the broad senses of "theory." The reason for this is that there is understanding on both of the levels of living understandingly: the primary level of interaction, and thus of self-understanding and life-praxis; and the secondary level of discourse, and thus of critical reflection and proper (*sic!*) theory.

One value of Bochenski's two term-three term distinction between "theoretical propositions" and "practical propositions," on the one hand, and "instructions," on the other, is the clarification it provides of what lies behind—or beneath—my distinction.

In my broad sense of the term, "theory" includes all propositions, theoretical and practical. Thus, assuming that the proper grammatical counterpart to the logical term "proposition" is "statement," or, possibly, "constative," one may say—slightly adapting Habermas's three-term distinction—that "theory" in my broad sense covers not only "theoretical statements," strictly and properly so called, but also "statements of opinion" and "action-orienting statements" as well. In my strict and proper sense, however, "theory" covers only all "theoretical statements," while excluding both "statements of opinion" and even "action-orienting statements" as such.

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