

I too often proceed as though there were only two main kinds of science, strictly and properly so-called, whereas in reality there are three:

(1) the kind represented by *the empirical sciences*, human (or social) as well as natural;

(2) the kind represented by *the axiomatic sciences* of logic and mathematics; and

(3) the kind uniquely represented by *metaphysics* (i.e., transcendental metaphysics in the broad sense inclusive of existentialist analysis as well as transcendental metaphysics *sensu stricto*).

Each of these kinds of science corresponds to some mode of (logical) modality, each of which in turn corresponds to some mode of (ontological) time or process:

(1) the kind represented by the empirical sciences corresponding to *the actual* (including the existent);

(2) the kind represented by the axiomatic sciences corresponding to *the possible*; and

(3) the kind represented by metaphysics corresponding to the necessary.

But all kinds of science are alike in that, as kinds of science, strictly and properly so-called, the vital question by which they are constituted is some *intellectual* question rather than any existential question; i.e., they abstract completely from any concern with meaning for us to attend entirely to *structure in itself*—whether that of actuality, or possibility, or necessity.