

I more and more see the need to consider carefully just how the following three things are both similar to and different from one another:

1. Hartshorne's threefold division of "knowledge" into "[1] mathematics, dealing with various '*possible* worlds,' or better, various *possible* logical structures; [2] natural and social science, dealing with the one *actual* world; [3] metaphysics, dealing with what is common and *necessary* to all possible states of affairs and all possible truth, including adjudication of the question of whether 'there is no world at all' represents a conceivable truth or is mere nonsense or contradiction" (*The Divine Relativity*: xiii).

2. Goodwin's threefold distinction of "truths" into (1) "contingent truths" that are "true in some possible worlds and *false in other possible worlds*"; (2) "conditionally necessary truths" that are "necessarily true in some possible worlds and *false in no possible worlds*" and therefore are also "nonexistential necessary truths"; and (3) "unconditionally necessary truths" whose criterion is not only "*falsity in no possible world*," but "*truth in all possible worlds*" and which therefore are "*existential*" as well as "*necessary*" (*The Ontological Argument of Charles Hartshorne*: 14, 17 f., 19 f.).

3. Nygren's threefold distinction of forms of "scientific," or "objective," argumentation into (1) "axiomatic," where the method is "deduction"; (2) "empirical," where the method involves "induction" as well as "deduction"; and (3) "philosophical," where the method, again, is "deduction," albeit in the different sense of "presuppositional analysis," i.e., deduction from X of its necessary presuppositions or conditions of possibility, as distinct from deduction of X from certain axioms that necessarily imply it (*Meaning and Method*: 65-125, *et passim*).

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