

Nygren argues that "[w]e can only speak of science where there is a possibility of objective argumentation." In the sciences, he insists, "it is not enough simply to postulate and assert. We demand reasons for the assertion" (219).

But granting that the possibility of some form or mode of objective argumentation is indeed a necessary condition of the possibility of speaking of science, I question whether it is also a *sufficient* condition—as it seems to me Nygren either supposes or fails to make clear that he does not suppose (cf., e.g., 120). In fact, I should want to hold that it is *not* a sufficient condition of the possibility of speaking of science, but only of critical reflection and proper theory.

Also necessary, in my view, to the possibility of speaking of science, strictly and properly so-called, is that the constitutive question of the critical reflection and proper theory involved be an *intellectual* question rather than an existential question. That is, the constitutive question of science, which is to say, all sciences and kinds of science in the strict and proper sense, is the question of *structure in itself*, not the question of meaning for us.

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