

De George says, "One's conscience is not independent of [one]. It is [one's] practical reason (or [one's] practical reason with [one's] attitudes and feelings) relative to certain considered actions. To speak of the authority of conscience is the same as saying that eventually one must decide for [one]self how to act" ("The Nature and Function of Epistemic Authority": 91).

Assuming, as I do, that "reason," and therefore "practical reason," comprises two levels: our capacity for making or implying claims to validity; and our capacity for critically reflecting on them (i.e., critically interpreting as well as critically validating them), one could say that "conscience," understood as simply another name for "practical reason," includes both a "moral" level comprising particular moral principles, rules, and so on, that make or imply a claim to be morally valid, and a "transmoral" level, in our capacity to critically interpret such principles and rules, and to critically validate their claim to be morally valid.

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