

"cultural lag" = "failure to profit from analyses already performed" (106).

"to be largely free of cultural lag" = "to be acquainted with the relevant history of ideas and with the results of analytic exploration" (111) = "to be aware of the doctrines [one] implicitly reject[s]" (111).

Hartshorne, in his way, concedes the limitation of trust in "the technical work done by our ancestors" (112). It is precisely "undue trust in highly technical or unusual uses of words that made [certain traditional dogmas in theology and metaphysics] seem invulnerable." Words and phrases "were used in pretentious ways not justified by the degree of care with which they [or: their meanings?] were explicated and related to experience and to words in ordinary, well certified use." Therefore, the "objections to [technical] philosophy" by philosophers like Hume, Moore, Wittgenstein, et al. "were probably necessary if the hold of [these dogmas] . . . was to be sufficiently weakened to facilitate further advance." Clearly, by implication Hartshorne recognizes that, as I say, the "history of ideas," or "intellectual history," properly distinguished as such, has only secondary evidential force, relative to the primary evidence of experience and of language having ordinary, well certified uses.