

According to Collingwood:

[W]hen Kant, working out Descartes' ideas a stage further, says, 'I must abolish knowledge in order to make room for faith,' he does certainly mean that God, freedom, and immortality cannot be proved; but this is not because they are not real, for in his view they *are* real, nor because he thinks we cannot or need not be absolutely certain that they are real, for nothing is further from his mind than the suggestion that they are mere postulates or hypotheses, the suggestion that we ought to act *as if* God existed, whether he does exist or not. God, freedom, and immortality are truths, according to Kant, of which life itself assures us: all life, not merely this or that special form of experience, like undergoing conversion or seeing ghosts. These special experiences do not prove anything in particular, for the conversion may be a nerve-storm, and the ghost a fraud or a hallucination. But in our universal and necessary experience of every day we are actually aware, if only we can detect and isolate this awareness, of our own responsibility and spontaneity, of our timeless and eternal reality, and of the existence of an infinite mind upon which our own finite nature somehow depends. These are certainties of precisely the same kind as Descartes' *cogito ergo sum*. They cannot be proved, because they lie too close to us; you cannot demonstrate them any more than you can button up your own skin; they are the presuppositions of all proof whatever, not like the Aristotelian axioms, which enter into all particular arguments as their premises, but rather as the conditions of there being any arguments at all (*Faith & Reason*: 114 f.).

Compare Hartshorne's statement:

Kant was noble in saying that our moral obligations and the starry heavens awakened his reverence; he was right in holding that we must view ourselves as in some sense everlastingly (not eternally, timelessly ) real, also in some genuine sense free; that we should believe in a superintelligent being worthy of worship; should value ourselves and other people according to the same principles and live entirely for the summum bonum as made possible by God but also partly dependent on our use of our freedom (*The Zero Fallacy*: 167).

20 April 2005