

I quite overlooked an important difference in concluding that Kant's own position, finally, is that of the Jewish prophets.

I should have recognized that Kant, in his way, already makes the same point that Bultmann makes later about Israel—namely, that, although it publicly places human beings under God's demand, the laws it imposes as expressive of this demand (1) are only partly moral, while in another part ceremonial or ritual; and (2) have to do, even in the case of the moral laws, exclusively with the "*what*" of action, to the exclusion of its "*how*," i.e., "the whole realm of inner disposition or attitude" (*Religion*: 74; *Existence and Faith*: 203). Therefore, while the prophets do indeed succeed in purifying the laws in the direction of making the obedience God demands primarily, if not purely, moral, they still do not manage to deal with the inner disposition of action, with the exception, possibly, of Jeremiah and then, finally, Jesus.

Assuming that this account is essentially correct, one may say that Kant's position is that of the prophets only if it is the later prophets, especially Jesus, whose position is in question.

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