

Value judgments employing gerundive predicates presuppose (1) norms; and (2) judgments of fact to the effect that subjects to which gerundive predicates are applied have the characteristics that the relevant norms specify as requisite to their valid application. So the value judgment, "x is good (worthy of approval or a pro-attitude)" may be validly inferred from these two premises: (1) good x's are those that have the characteristics *a*, *b*, and *c*; and (2) *x* in fact has the characteristics, *a*, *b*, and *c*.

Assuming this analysis as essentially correct, one can understand objective relativism as a value theory to affirm norms of the form, good x's are those that have factual characteristics *a*, *b*, and *c* because these characteristics are good for things having factual characteristics *d*, *e*, and *f*. (This simply applies H. Richard Niebuhr's principle that, if one being is good for another, it is because of its structure and the way in which its structure corresponds to the structure of the other being, so as to meet the other being's needs, fit its capacity, complement its potentialities, and so on.) Thus "x is good for things having factual characteristics *d*, *e*, and *f*" may be validly inferred from this norm taken as the major premise, together with the judgment of fact, "x has the characteristics *a*, *b*, and *c*," as the minor premise.

As for objective relativism's concept, "center of value," it is equivalent functionally to "(primary) determinant of meaning" (V. Brümmer). In the example cited, things having factual characteristics *d*, *e*, and *f* are "centers of value," or "(primary) determinants of meaning," for things having factual characteristics *a*, *b*, and *c*.

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