

I find it interesting (and supportive!) that there are places where Apel argues that among the things we must presuppose in presupposing “an unlimited community of discourse or argumentation” is not only that all of its members have uncoerced access to all the relevant evidence, but also that it “has at its disposal a sufficiently shared and clear language in which it can formulate not only its problems but also possible solutions to these problems.” To which he adds, “This further presupposes that certain rules of argumentation are to be followed as normative conditions for the very possibility of discussion, that is[,] of the consensual redemption or critique of truth claims” (“Can an Ultimate Foundation of Knowledge Be Non-Metaphysical?” in Marianna Papastephanou (ed.), *From a Transcendental-Semiotic Point of View* [Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998], 87).

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