

I have become accustomed to distinguishing between “the structure of God [or ultimate reality] in itself” and “the meaning of God [or ultimate reality] for us.” But one difficulty with doing this is that it is not simply the utterly abstract metaphysical *structure* of God (or ultimate reality) of which the meaning of God (or of ultimate reality) for us is the meaning; it is rather the whole concrete *being* of God (or of ultimate reality), which, of course, includes its abstract structure.

So I wonder whether the basic distinction shouldn't be between “the *being* of God [or ultimate reality] in itself” and “the *meaning* of God [or ultimate reality] for us. The further distinction between *structure* and meaning can then play its proper role of distinguishing respectively between relatively abstract and relatively concrete ways of dealing with being.

Perhaps another way of formulating this question is to ask whether “being” isn't the proper term to refer to God (or ultimate reality) as *material* object, while “structure” and “meaning” are the proper terms to refer to the *formal* objects respectively of two different ways of dealing with this material object, i.e., of metaphysics, on the one hand, and of faith or religion, on the other.

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