

One and the same proposition may constitute the content of either:

- (1) an *opinion*;
- (2) a *theoretical statement*; or
- (3) a statement of *action-orienting knowledge*.

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The obligations immanent in speech acts can be met at two levels:

- (1) immediately, in the context of action/interaction; and
- (2) mediately, in discourse.

This explains the need to distinguish two senses in which "theory," like "reason," can be understood. Already at the primary level of self-understanding and life-praxis, the obligations one assumes in making or implying claims to validity can be met "immediately," because even at this level there is theory as well as praxis. On the other hand, one must discharge one's obligations "mediately," insofar as one has to move from the primary level of self-understanding and life-praxis to the secondary level of critical reflection and proper theory.

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