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In some places, Hartshorne speaks of "1eve1s of existence,11 distinguishing three such: (1) lithe occurrence \[sic\!\] of certa-in actual states of individuals"; (2) lithe existence of certain \-individua1s"; (3) lithe existence of certain kinds of individuals or of certain class-properties^'l (LP: 63 f.; cf. RSP: 204 f.). Of these he says, lithe kinds^kinds\^ \[~. of individuals = class properties\] cannot exist save in individuals, nor the individuals save in states; still, in which individuals or states they exist remains a further, a contingent determination." "Individuals exist in states, each of which can only be contingent; but that there ar\~ states embodying the individual mayor may not be contingent, depending upon whether or not the definition of 'state of" Contingency is found wherever .,
one goes from the abstract toward the concrete. 'Something existsdoes not entail 'Animals exist,' this does notentail 'Foxes exist,' and this does not not  entail, 'Fox here with torn left ear exists"' Any step toward concrete particularity is logically a non-necessary one. But, likewise, any step from the particular to the specific of which it is a particularization, or from the