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By its very logic, any transcendental term other than "God" can-and, iftheism is intelligible, must-be used in two infinitely different senses, each of which is literaL In being so used, however, the term does not lose but retains the same literal sense it has in any of its uses as a transcendental term. Thus if"existence," for example, is just such a term, then, on any ofits uses, to say that something exists means literally that the essence of the thing is somehow actualized, in some actual, and therefore necessarily contingent, state. Nor can this same literal meaning ever fail"be retained on any use of"existence" if it is to be used intelligibly. At the same time, this literal meaning of the term allows forand, again, if theism is intelligible, requires – its use in both of two infinitely different senses, each of which is also literal, Le., the sense in which it applies to all existents other than God, which exist and can exist, contingently, on some conditions, only; and the sense in which it applies solely to the unique existent God, which alone exists and must exist necessarily, on all conditions whatever. So, too, with the other transcendental term "individual." For anything at all to be a concrete individual, as distinct from a mere ideal or abstraction, it must be literally related somehow both to itself and to others comparably concrete. And "individual" can lose this literal meaning only by no longerbeing used intelligibly. Still, this literal meaning itself allows for-and, yet again, if theism is true, requires – the term's being used in two infinitely different senses, both of which are likewise literal, i.e., the sense in which it applies to all the many particular individuals that are literally related to selfand others only partially and inadequately; and the sense in which it applies solely to the one universal individual called "God," whose self-and other-relations are just as literally impartial and wholly adequate. 

But ifterms if terms held to be used analogically in this stricter, more specific sense must, by their very logic, also be used literally in both ofthe respects thus explained, then, clearly their meaning is reducible to, whether or not it is simply identified with, the literal kind ofmeaning.

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