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I defend this answer as follows. Granted that "value" in the most general sense means either the good-for-ness or the bad-for-ness of one being for some other-in this being a term that functions very much like "being," which, in its most general sense means being the object for some subject-there remains a difference between beings that can only be good or bad for other beings and beings for which other beings can be good or bad. Clearly, beings for which other beings can be valuable are themselves "centers of value" in a way in which beings that can only be valuable for other beings are not. But to be a center of value for others is to be intrinsically valuable relative to those others, just as they are instrumentally valuable relative to that same center of value, even though in other relationships this same center of value may be instrumentally valuable relative to some other centers, just as the beings that are of instrumental value for it may in other relationships be intrinsically valuable because they in turn are centers of value for others. In sum: the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value is as well founded and indispensable ontologically as the distinction between fully real, internal relations, on the one hand, and merely logical, external relations, on the other – or, alternatively, between – subjects (or concretes) and- objects - – (or abstracts). That which is not only object for other subjects but also subject for other objects- -– or, in other words, that which is not only logically, externally related to others but also really, internally related to others – is intrinsically, not merely instrumentally, valuable in respect to that particular relationship. 

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