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Of all that exists, everything might not have existed except "something" and what it necessarily implies-namely, the one divine something inclusive (actually or potentially) of all the many (actual or potential) nondivine somethings. Although particularization of mere somethingness-divine or nondivine-is and must be contingent, in that every step from the most universal property of somethingness toward its particularization is and must be contingent, it is not contingent but necessary that Of all that th.atexiststhat exists, what, if anything, might not have existed? _some_ _contingent particularization of somethingness-divine and nondivine--occur._Hartshorne says that existence generically is "the self-identity of \[God's\] allparticipating life." "God is ... more or less self-evidently contained in the mere idea of one's own existence, ... not merely as cause of our 'coming to be' but as constitutive of the very meaning of 'coming to be.' .._(MVG:\_ _279 ff). _The first statement is simply the conclusion of the reasoning summarized above; i.e., "existence" is evidently but another way ofsaying "somethingness," which is there defined as, in effect, the self-identity oftheof the one divine something as inclusive (actually or potentially) ofallof all the many (actual or potential) nondivine somethings. But what about the distinction made in the second statement between God's being beinggrollndgrollnd of ofourour meaning,_cause qfour coming to he_ _and being_ _constitutive_ _(~lthe_ _ve,y meaning_ _(~l{_}{_}our "coming to he"?_ _Is it the same as, or is it different from, the distinction I commonly make between God's being_ _the ground of_ _0111'_ _being,_ _by making our being really possible in fact as well as in principle, and being_ _tile_ _by making our being really real and everlastingly significant? The two distinctions, I take it, are essentially the same. To exist, or to be something, is to exist, or to be something, for God. God exists, or is something, for God; and everything other than God exists, or is something, for God-if, indeed, it exists, or is something, at alL all._
Hartshorne says in the same context, "\[W\]e do not 'act' in a pub1ic sense (in the sense in which 'reality' is not a solipsistic concept), that is, we do not really act, except as we act upon God, no matter what else we act upon.It is \[God's\] response to us that makes our act real, in the sense in which we can call the acts of others also real, and that is the sense of 'reality.''' I take it that this statement fully confirms the essential identity of Hartshorne's distinction with mine. To say that God is constitutive oftheof the very meaning of our "coming to be" is only verbally different from saying either that to exist, or to be something, is to exist, or to be something for God or from saying that what we are and do is really significant only because we act upon God and of God's response to us.