Page History

...

But, then, if I reject, as I do, the idea of "God's mind" as having any but a symbolic, nonliteral meaning (if it is to have any clear and coherent meaning at all), how do I account for the "some embodiment" that-on an Aristotelian-WhiteheadianHartshornean Whiteheadian-Hartshornean understanding of the "ontological principle"-universals have to have') 

I account for it by thinking and speaking, not of "God's mind," except as a symbolic, nonliteral concept and term, but of the universal individual's unqual(fied unqualfied inclusion (?lall modes l?lreality---possibility (both ontological and ontic) as well as actuality Hartshorne himself says that "all-inclusiveness, non-duality, is a formal character of deity," which, as such, can be stated formally and, therefore, literally, by saying "God is coincident with all truth and reality" ("The Idea of God": 5). But, then, while one certainly may interpret such literal modal coincidence by means ofthe of the psychicalist concept, "God's mind," there is just as certainly no reason why one mllst so interpret it, since the purely formal, literal statemennhat the universal individual is allinclusive suffices to make the point-at least so far as metaphysics is concerned. 

...

It clearly seems important to take aCCQunt account of this Aristotelian understanding in any treatment of abstracts. But in a strictly formal or transcendental metaphysics it will not do to say with Hartshorne and other idealists that the Aristotelian requirement can be met, provided only that the abstract in question is conceived by some mind, and that it in fact is met because every abstract is conceived, at least implicitly, by the divine mind.

...