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As between objects that are also subjects, there is a further logical-ontological type-difference in that some of them cannot, while others can, also be real for themselves as processes of becoming -- the.first type  ofsubjects of subjects being events, the second type, individuals. _Subjects of both types are not only real for the extraordinary, everlasting individual and also for at least some other things that either have become or are in process of becoming real, but also such that other things can be real for them as themselves processes of becoming. Events, however, cannot be real for themselves but only for other events and/or individuals, whereas individuals can also be real for themselves. Events become and perish but do not change; individuals, by contrast, change whether or not they also become and perish, as ordinary, transitory individuals do, and the one extraordinary, everlasting individual does not. Thus, as between events and individuals, there is also a difference between types of identity-the identity proper to events being strict,_ that proper to individuals, genetic. The identity of an event is strict because it has, or is essentially qualified by, all ofits of its properties, whereas thc the identity of an individual is genetic because it has, or is essentially qualificd qualified by, only some of its properties, having, or being qualified by, others only inessentially or accidentally. 
There is another d(fforence difference in logical-ontological type between individualsnamelyindividuals namely, that between the many ordinary, transitory individuals, for which only some things can be real and which themselves can be real for only some things, and the one extraordinary, everlasting individual, for which an things are real and which itself is real for all things. _Whereas there are and must be many_ ordinary, transitory individuals, there is and can be only the one extraordinary, everlasting individual, since, if it is both real for all things and such that all things are real for it, there neither is nor can be anything to distinguish anyone such individual from any other. By the same token, the one and only extraordinary, everlasting individual cannot fail to be real, provided only that the concept "extraordinary, everlasting individual" is both clear and coherent. That it is both clear and coherent is evident, arguably, because all other things and concepts necessarily imply it. Another logical-ontological type-difference is between ordinary, transitory individuals themselves, in that !,,some of them are, while others are not, capable of understanding, those who are thus capable being properly distinguished as "existents" in the emphatic sense of the term. _All ordinary, transitory individuals are such that some things are real for them and they can also be real for themselves and the extraordinary, everlasting individual as well as for at least some other events and/or individuals. But only some ordinary, transitory individuals are capable of understanding themselves as well as others and the whole and therefore also understanding what it is to be real both in the most general sense and in the various senses reflecting the logical-ontological type-differences bridged by this most general sense of "reality" (see Thesis 1).  qllhe The other two differences in logical-ontological type that require to be clarified, onei.\< the difference with respect to both events and individuals between singulars and aggregates, i. e., between anyone event or individual, on the one hand, and any group o.l events and/or individuals lacking in the subjective unity (~lany of its members, on the other._
An aggregate, or composite, is distinguished from a singular, whether event or individual, because it lacks the unity of the singulars composing it.

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