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Among such factually falsifiable utterances are those about the primal fact of human existence as well as about the world and God as related to it or to other facts specifically as such. To be sure, even some anthropological utterances may be, in a broad sense, metaphysical. Although human existence is entirely factual or contingent and so in principle different from the strictly necessary existence of God and, in a suitably different sense, of the world as wcJC well it nevertheless has a unique pri111acyprimacy, which insofar entitles it to be included among the objects of metaphysical understanding. It has such primacy becC1usebecause, although it is certainly not constitutive of reality as such, God alone being the individual who is that, it is constitutive of our IIlli.icrsfl7l1ding understanding of reality. But for the fact of our existence as human, not only would we have no understanding whatever, not even elnpiricaJ empirical or scientific, but we also vvould have no understanding of the inner nature of reality as such. We ourselves are the one existent whose nature we understand by being it, by understandin.g understanding it, so to speak, fr0111 from within as well as front
'ithoutfrom without. Consequently, such knowledge as we can have of tbe the inner nature of _of anything else we can have only by way of analogy with whatever we are able to know of our own existence. Because  

Because this is so, there is one sense of the word "anthropology" in which it is properly taken, along with "cosmology" and "theology" to designate the nonelnpirical nonempirical inquiries of special Inetaphysicsmetaphysics. Nevertheless, since our own existence, unlike that of God and the woddworld, merely factuat factual, such utterances as we can 111.ake make about it, or about the world and God as related to it or to other facts, are Inerely merely factual clailns claims that could conceivably be fillsefalse.

 Because religious utterances are typically of this kind, being about lnnnan human existence a.nd and its authentic realization, Inanymany, if not aU all of theInthem, are factually falsifiable. Of course, the qualification is essentiat essential, since foundational religious u.tterances utterances about God's existence and essential nature and activity arc strictly . metaphysical and so in no way subject to factual falsification. But true and iinportant important as this is, it is also true tll.at that specifically religious utterances are in nlany many cases the kind of utterances whose trut.h truth or falsity is entirely a matter of fact. Given t.he the essential content of these utterances, indeed, it couJd could not be otherwise. Thus, frorn from the standpoint of Christian f,l itllfaith, for ins tanceinstance, this logical truth but reflects the truth of its own witness that our creation and consumnl.ation consummation alike are not necessary but free, being entirely the gift of God's grace to be obediently received by the faith that works through love. Given  

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Given the axioins of classical Christian theisllltheism., especially the archaxionl archaxiom of the divine "simplicity"sinlplicity, it follows necessarily that no assertion about God can be factuClLly factually nonfalsifiable unless all assertions about God are so. In other words, the classical theist can consistently construe the theistic issue as a properly metaphysical issue only by accepting the implication that it is _J1olliil1S bill nothing but a metaphysical issue -- with the further ilnplication that God is insofiH insofar forth irrelevant to our life in the world because it Cil.l1 can be of no possible relevance to God. 

But how different the case of the neoclassical theist, who frankly rejects the aXiOlTl axiom of "sinlplicitysimplicity," l11.aintaining maintaining instead that God is not a rnonopolar but ,I a dipolar God, \;\fhowho -- although existing necessarily as God -- essentially exists only as the God of some world of contingent individuals other than CodselfGodself, to all of which God is related internally as well as externally. Given these ,1Jterna ti ve axiol11.s, the fundalnental alternative axiom, the fundamental assertions that God exists and exists as God, as the one universal individual who is the all-inclusive ground (md and end of all other individuals and events, are all strictly 111.etaphysical c1ssertions metaphysical assertions and as such iln111.Une immune to factual falsification. But if these assertions are true, they necessarily i111.ply imply that any nUlnber number of other, Inerely merely factual assertions 111llSt ellso must also be true, even though they do not ilnplyimply, of course, just which sLlch Clssertions such assertions actually are true. Furthern1.oreFurthermore, necessarily included clmong among sllch ,1sserUons are certain factual assertions about God, all of which hzwe the forrn of asserting that God sOlnehow appropriately related internally to just this, that, or the other particular world of contingent individuals and events'thilt in fact happpens to exist. Being factual, these assertions Clbout God are so far frOln being immune to factual falsification as to be factually falsifiable in a perfectly straightforward sense. Had some other world existed than actuaHy exists, God would appropriately related to it instead, and any assertion that God is son1.ehow related to the actual world would of necessity be false. This need not ilnply, naturally, that such factual c1ssertions 1:1S111(1), be l11.ade about God are also empirically falsifiable, in the sense, say, til,lt their lneaning is equivalent to their "empirical expectations." 

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