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"However, there is another way of viewing the matter .... Granted that an actual feeling is always Second (because \[r\]elative to a stimulus), does it follow that the stimulating entity is, in its turn, relative to the feeling it elicits? ..
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"The concretely, though relatively, First or nonrelative is ... simply the earlier in the causal-temporal series. What about the _absolutely_ _nonrelative, if there can be such a thing? Must it not be some primordial and eternal essence, or realm of essences, the pure possibility of existence in general, which is prior to any particular situation? Theologically this must somehow coincide with the 'primordial nature' of God, or with \[God's\] primordial creativity or power.... Pure Firstness must be completely abstract, for by definition it is independent of, and so abstractable from, all particular concrete cases" (460)._

*\[I\]n* *itself, say as an event, it need not be taken as relative to the feeling. Rather the feeling is Second to the thing felt, which* *{_}in this context{_}* *{_}is First; and this relation is not reversible or symmetrical. ... Nevertheless, the First event to which the Second feeling is relative may itself,_* *{_}in another context,_* *{_}be relative. As an event{_}* *{_}it{_}* *{_}may be relative to a still earlier event. In.deed, it may itself be a prior responsive or reactive feeling, with its own stimulus.... Thus we have a chain of Seconds which, reversing the direction of analysis, is also a chain of Firsts. The Firstness or Absoluteness is, to be sure, relative only, but for all that, perfectly definite and genuine. The earlier experience was{_}* *{_}strictly{_}* *{_}independent of its successor, though not of its predecessor" ("Peirce's 'One Contribution''': 459). _* 
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"\[E\]ven the relatively nonrelative is, in a sense, abstract.... \[T\]he relatively absolute is also relatively abstract. And moreover, we may also say ... that the relatively nonrelative is (in a similarly relative sense) possibility rather than actuality. Yesterday, to be sure, was no 'mere possibility,' it~was possibility, relatively speaking, for it furnished that possibility of which today is the actualization. It was the possibility of a certain kind of successor which otherwise would not have been possible. So absolutely speaking;. Firstness as such means the possibility and the essence, not the actual _existence,_ _of feeling. Only so far as the earlier feeling was itself a Second was it, too, actual" (460 f.) _

"Simply or Absolutely First is only the universal Source of all things; simply or Absolutely Second is only the universal Summation or divine Memory of all things; simply or Absolute Third is only the llil.iversal Law or Guiding Purpose of all things" (473).
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H\[Firstness\] is not an actual feeling; for that is relative to a given which, by sympathetic suggestion, imparts quality to it. Only the quality itself, in abstraction from what imparts it or receives it, is self-sufficient or nonrelative. It is what might be imparted or received.... But now we must note that nonrelativity admits of more or less, and that there is no contradiction in the idea of an absoluteness which is not absolutely absolute. The absolutely absolute is that which is what it is regardless of _all_ _else, or that which is independent of any and all relations to other things. But a thing may be independent of_ _some_ _relations, and with respect to these relations and their terms literally absolute, while remaining as literally relative so far as certain other relations and terms are concerned. Thus 'relatively absolute" is a perfectly sensible expression, meaning, 'not affected or constituted by_ _some_ _relations having the thing as term,' though constituted by other relations. Accordingly, 'absolute' means the negation of relativity or dependence with respect to various relations or terms; and only in the extreme case will this negation apply to_ _all_ _relations and terms. Apart from this extreme case, we have the relatively absolute. This does not mean a vague dilution of the idea of absoluteness. With respect to certain terms, the thing is literally and strictly absolute._ _It_ _might be better to say, respectively absolute, rather than relatively absolute" ("Relativity of Nonrelativity": 219). _

"\[L\]et us reconsider the nonactuality of Firstness, its identity with pOSSibility. Actuality is relative, for at least it supervenes upon an antecedent actuality to which it is essentially related. The effect is relative to the cause, as a preceding event. But is a cause in the same sense relative to succeeding events, its effects? The doctrine of determinism implies that this is the case. . . . But ... an event is relative only to earlier events, never to later ones in their exact particularity. The present is the utmost verge of determinate actuality.... Regardless of what happens later, the present is what it is. Thus the present is absolute with respect to later events. There can be no dyadic relation of action-reaction, no{_}mutual_ _relativity, between_ _it_ _and succeeding events, but only a one-way relation of responsiveness or adaptation. Future events will relate themselves to this present event, but it has nothing to do with them. As it takes determinate shape, there are no actual later events, for_ _it_ _is the latest of actualities. Only antecedent actualities can be objects of_ \_its _relativity. Thus every event is First so far as succeeding events are concerned, and Second so far as earlier ones are concerned. Now ... this is, in a way,. a confirmation rather than contradiction of the doctrine that the Monad is possibility rather than actuality. For the actuality of the present is the possibility of the future. That such and such an event is here and now possible is because a suitable predecessor of such an event is here and now actual. ... The actuality of the present involves the antecedent actuality of its past, but it involves merely the potentiality of later events.