Page History

An instructive example of proceeding in these two ways is offered in effect by lvor Leclerc in _Whitehead's_ _Metaphysics._ Leclerc argues that Whitehead entirely agrees with Aristotle in understanding metaphysics as the attempt to conceive "a complete fact," or \!la"a complete existence." "By 'a complete fact' Whitehead means precisely what Aristotle meant by the _that_ which _'is_ in this sense.'" Thus, "\[wlhenwhen Whitehead says the problem _\[sc._ of metaphysicsl is 'to conceive a complete fact' he means thereby what Aristotle meant in declaring the problem to be: 'what that is whjchwhich _is_ in this sense _\[sc._ in the sense of ouolulouova.'.." (17 f.). But, of course, as Leclerc goes on to show at great length in the rest of _his_ book, \VhiteheadWhitehead's _soilltionsolution_ to the problem significantly differs from Aristotle's precisely because he takes "a complete fact," or a 'funyfully existent' entity," to be "an actual entity," as distinct from "a particular and actually existing thing," which is to say, an enduring individual that Aristotle takes (1)Otuouva properly to refer to. So whether Leclerc ever Inakesmakes my distinction between "formal" and "material"and I have not confirmed that he does-he certainly employs it, or something very like it, in arguing for his understanding of WhitehadWhitehead's relation to "the great philosophical tradition."