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Just as myth may be said to be the thought form distinctive of primitive or pre-axial religions-whence Prozesky's term, "mythological naturalism"----so categorial metaphysics may be said to be the form distinctive of the axial religions, whether--again in Prozesky's termsterm---"spiritual monism" or "transcendental monotheism." (In Prozesky's view, both of these forms of axial religion are forms of lithe other-worldly hypothesis," as distinct from the worldly hypothesis of mythological naturalism.) 

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Also clear, if perhaps somewhat less so, is the pivotal role of our experience as structured into external sense experience of ourselves and the world, on the one hand, and internal nonsensuous experience of ourselves, others, and the whole, on the other hand. Thus myth represents an objectification of our internal experience in the terms and categories of our external experience, while categorial metaphysics represents an objectification of our internal experience in the terms and categories of our internal experience, and transcendental metaphysics consists in an objectification of our internal experience in terms of the existentialtranscendental existential transcendental concepts and terms necessarily implied by the terms and categories of our internal experience.n.d.; rev. 24 July 2002