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On an adequate theory of modality, according to which possibility in principle is ontological flS as well as logical, "real" and "logical" possibility are correlative, every real possibility being also a logical possibility-and vice versa. jJl principle

But there remains the important distinction between being possible merely in principle and find being possible also ill filetin fact. Why not express this distinction by further distinguishing "ontological possibility" from "ollticontic possibility"?

Then one may say that, although any logical possibility is also an ontological possibility (and vice versa), not every ontological possibility (and, therefore, logical possibility) is also an ontic possibility. Why not? Because whereas possibility"? x is a logical possibility if, and only if, it makes coherent sense, and is an ontological possibility if, and only if, its actuality is compatible with the nature of concrescence as such, flS as indispensably referred to by anything that does mflke make coherent sense, x is an ontic possibility if, and only if, certain ontic, or factual, conditions necessary to its actuality make it so.

Thus I understand:
by "loXiclll logical possibility," 20 August 2003; rev. 4 April 2009"flnything "anything that makes coherent sense";
by "olltoloXical outological possibility," "anything whose actuality is compatible with the nature of concrescence as such, as the indispensable referent of all coherent meaning"; and by "olltie ontic possibility," "anything whose actuality is made possible by certain ontic, or factual, conditions that are not only possible but actuaL"

But there remains the important distinction between being possible merely

Then one may say that, although flny logical possibility is also fin ontologicfll possibility (and vice versa), not every ontologicfll possibility (and, therefore, logical possibility) is also an ontic possibility. Why not? Because whereas

actual."

20 August 2003; rev. 4 April 2009Thus I understand: