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4. Types 1, 3, and 5 seem straightforward enough, the first and last representing the two extreme contrary positions, the second representing their common contradictory. But Types 2 and 4 are alike peculiar, albeit in opposite ways, in that, while they understand theology properly to acknowledge both criteria and to be concerned with satisfying both of them, they also understand it properly to concern itself with satisfying one of the criteria by primarily concerning itself with satisfying the other. Thus, for example, a theologian of Type 2 can say, as David Pailin does, that "Christian faith in God demands that its self-understanding be finally determined not by its inherited cumulative tradition but by what may warrantably be held to be true (whatever qualifications self-critical reason shows to be necessary to recognize the relativity of any claim to perceive the truth)" (A Gentle Touch:
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64), while a theologian of Type 4 can say, as I seem to recall Karl Barth's saying, that "the only good apologetics is a good dogmatics." Characteristic of both of these even-numbered types, then, is that, while they recognize both of the criteria, they regard one of them as, in effect, reducible to the other, whether appropriateness to credibility, or credibility to appropriateness. By contrast, Types 1, 3, and 5 all presuppose the mutual irreducibility of the two criteria, Types 1 and 5, by each acknowledging only one of them, Type 3, by acknowledging both of them, but insisting on the irreducibility of either to the other.

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