Page History

...

Second Thoughts on The Point of Christology

24 – 1 I should have said that what the passage as a whole (Mt 16:15 ff.) authorizes is not the existence of Peter, but rather the confession, or witness, of Peter. For, as I go on to say, it is "because of his confession" that Peter is the rock on which Jesus will build the church, etc. True, I do speak of "Peter, the representative disciple." But there is nevertheless a diversion in speaking of his existence instead of keeping everything sharply focused on his witness.

...

n.d.; rev. 8 February 2000unmigrated-wiki-markup

xi -- – "... a critical inquiry into the point of all such doctrinal formulations"

1 f. -- "\[T\]he witness to Jesus as the Christ" is "christology in the primary sense of the word," while "either the process or the product of critically reflecting on \[this\] witness"is "christology in another, secondary sense."

4 -- "\[T\]he principal task to which this book is offered as a contribution" is "to further the effort in our situation today toward a christology of reflection that will be fully critical. . . ." Alternatively, is is "to help develop a christology of reflection that, again in our situation, will be credible as well as appropriate . . . ." More simply still, it is lito"to make the point of the christology of witness as theology today is given and called to make this point."
5 -- But 

5 – But "one can make the point of christology today only by also talking about it."

14 -- "The specific problem this book is an attempt to solve . . . is whether there can be such a thing as a revisionary christology that is not problematic in this same way \[_sc_. as all or most other revisionary christologies, past and present\]."

What do I seek to do in The Point of Christology?

What I seek to do is to work out the proper construction (or construal) of christological formulations -- – analogously to Matthew Arnold's effort in Literature and Dogma and Rudolf Bultmann's in "Neues Testament und Mythologie. "

In the first four chapters, I work this construction out formally, by analyzing the logical structure of christological formulations, i.e., by distinguishing the christological assertion they formulate, the question they answer, the subject they are about, and the conditions of their being true. In the second four chapters, then, I work this construction out materially, by formulating the christological assertion (as distinguished in the first four chapters) in the terms in which it would need to be formulated today to be both appropriate and credible.

In doing this, of course, there are all sorts of special questions that I do not discuss, such as, for example, the meaning of talk about the resurrection of Jesus. But such a discussion is hardly neq~sarynecessary, anyhow, once one understands my construction of christological formulations in both their formal and their material meaning. Talk about Jesus' resurrection is simply one among a number of ways of formulating the christological assertion of his decisive significance for human existence. Therefore, to understand formally what any such way involves and materially how one would most appropriately and credibly formulate the christological assertion today is to understand all that anyone needs to understand in order to understand talk of Jesus' resurrection.

As for the polemic that is partly explicit, partly implicit, in my argument, it is directed throughout to a mistaken construction of christological formulations and of the assertion they formulate -- – analogously to Arnold's polemic against the "literary misapprehension" of orthodox theology and Bultmann's polemic against the "objectifying" conceptuality of traditional theology in both scripture and tradition. I find it significant that Arnold and Bultmann both recognize that the usual revisions of orthodoxy do not succeed in locating the real problem because they share the same 2 underlying assumptions -- – just as I argue that, although the usual revisionary christology may give a different answer to the traditional christological question, it nonetheless assumes that the traditional question itself is the right question.

n.d.; rev. 8 February 2000