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2. 3. It also means that the "causative authority" of scripture is simply a way of speaking of what we might prefer to call its "motive authority," using "motive" in its now somewhat rare use as an adjective meaning "that moves or tends to move a person to a course of action" _(OED)_. It is in just this adjectival sense, of course, that "motive" is used in my translation of Hollaz's statement that, in respect of its former mode of employment, holy scripture is called "causative or motive of faith \[_causativa aut motiva fidei_\]." In other words, scripture is said properly to cause one's faith only in the sense that it moves one to faith \-\- namely, by its own manifest credibility, or worthiness to be believed, which is in turn founded in its dependence on God and in God's own veracity. And so, too, are we to understand the statements that scripture generates faith in the unbeliever and confirms it in the believer. It "generates" and "confirms" faith in the same way in which it "causes" faith \-\- namely, by moving one to believe because of its own manifest credibility.

2. 4. But, then, if to speak of scripture's "causative authority," thus understood, need not be thought to say too much, to say only that scripture (or, in my view, the apostolic witness) "occasions" faith may well be thought to say too little \-\- not only from the standpoint of Protestant orthodoxy, but also from Bultmann's standpoint and, in a somewhat different way, also from mine. There is a point, to be sure, in saying that "it is God, not the Bible, who brings us to faith, insofar as our faith is something given or brought about, by activating our freedom." But if scripture's authority, whether causative or normative, is "one and the same, being founded in the truthfulness of God and in scripture's dependence upon God," then one need not in any way encourage "the unfortunate tendency to divinize scripture itself" by saying that scripture (or the apostolic witness) not merely "occasions" faith, but rather "causes" it \-\- namely, in the only way in which as itself but an authority, even if the sole primary one, it could conceivably have the right and power to do so. Just as in its other mode as normative authority, and thus as "judge of theological controversies," scripture is, not _judex_ principalis _controversiarum theologicarum_, the Holy Spirit alone being that, but only _judex_ instrumentalis, so in its mode as causative authority, it can be said to be _causativa fidei_ only as _causa fidei_ instrumentalis, God alone being _causa fidei_ principalis (see Schmid{^}10^ : 53 f. \[emphasis added\]; cf. also Hunnius's parallel distinction between God and Christ as _fundamentum fidei essentiale aut substantiale_ and scripture as _fundamentum fidei organicum seu ministeriale_ \[E. Hirsch, _Hilfsbuch zum Studium der Dogmatik_: 296 ff.\]). On the other hand, to say that scripture (or the apostolic witness) does not cause one's faith but only occasions it may be only too readily taken (or mistaken) to mean that scripture (or the apostolic witness) functions merely Socratically, in Kierkegaard's sense, by occasioning our recollection of the timeless truth about existence in general, rather than functioning as personal address, by entitling and enabling one to actualize one's ownmost possibility of understanding oneself in particular. In any event, it is essential to say somehow that faith is always an "impossible possibility" for us in that God's prevenient love alone entitles and empowers us to entrust ourselves to it and then to live in loyalty to it by returning love both for God and for all whom God loves. For this reason, one may well want to say that scripture (or the apostolic witness) is not merely the occasion of one's faith but rather its cause, which is to say, of course, its instrumental cause, God's love alone being its principal cause.

2. 5. It is true enough that, when scripture is used in the normative mode of its authority, "it is the judge." But, as I have just pointed out, it is not the "principal judge," but rather the "instrumental judge" (or, in my view, the "_ministerial_ judge" \[_judex ministerialis_\], the apostolic witness alone being the "instrumental judge" \[cf. Schmid{^}10^: 54\]). Also, because there is but one and the same authority, whether we consider it in its causative mode or in its normative mode, it is as misleading to say that the canonical authority of scripture (or, in my view, the apostolic witness) "flows from" its causative authority as to say the reverse. Neither mode of authority may be properly said to "flow from" the other. For to talk about the causative authority of scripture (or the apostolic witness) is simply to talk about _an_ authority, albeit the sole primary one, in one of its two possible uses or functions \-\- namely, its use or function to authorize, i. e., to entitle and empower, faith \-\- just as to talk about the normative or canonical authority of scripture (or the apostolic witness) is simply to talk about the other possible use or function of that very same authority \-\- namely, its use or function to validate the claim of all other Christian witness to be appropriate to Jesus Christ.