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According to De George, "in order to grant anyone epistemic authority _y_ must know something about the field and enough to know that _x_ knows more than _y_ does." Thus it would be reasonable to acknowledge an authority in morality, say, only when "\[t\]he moral agent ... understand\[s\] what it means to be moral and to think in moral terms. If \[she or\] he does not, \[she or\] he may simply do as \[she or\] he is told or advised from habit or fear or inclination or laziness. But if \[she or\] he does know what it means to be moral and if \[she or\] he wishes to be moral, \[she or\] he may well seek moral guidance, and, I would argue, properly so. In full knowledge of the diversity of moral opinion and the dubiousness of finding the complete truth, \[she or\] he may judge on the basis of \[her or\] his own experience who it is who can guide \[her or\] him in moral matters, either because that person seems to know more or seems to act better than \[she or\] he \[her\- or\] himself. \[She or h\]e he may seek the knowledge, clear thinking, and the approach to problems in the light of principle which is supplied by the scholar; or \[she or\] he may seek the insight of someone who appears to \[her or\] him to be holy or at least morally commendable; or \[she or \] he may emulate the example of some saint or moral hero.