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 the f\!\!8fMHHw@litsrealitydisclosedby understanding based on sense experience and'fhe ultimate reality (including but not exhausted by the strictly ultimate reality) disclosed by understanding based on our nonsensuous experience. To understand the first in its structure in itself is to understand it in the way fully developed by the natural sciences, as well as by history in the sense of "objectifying observation of the historical past," whereas to understand the second in its structure in itself is to
understand it in the way fully developed by transcendental metaphysics
(including but not exhausted by existentialist analysis). On the other hand, to
understand the first in its meaning for us is to understand it in the way fully
developed by technology, whereas to understand the second in its meaning for us is to understand it in the way fully developed by morality or ethics and
religion.
Bultmann is not as clear about this second distinction, I take it, because he fails to appreciate-and thus to recognize clearly and consistently-the possibility and the necessity of metaphysics alongside religion. Thus, for example, all that he's willing to allow in the way of metaphysics, beyond existentialist analysis, is clarifying the "idea" or "concept" of God, as designating, in effect, the meaning of strictly ultimate reality for us, as distinct from anything like clarifying strictly ultimate reality in its structure in itself.
Bultmann also seems to me to confuse -- or to be in serious danger of confusing -- understanding things in their structure in themselves, whether
2
 scientifically or metaphysically, with understanding them "inauthentically," even though the only position consistent with his general principles requires one to distinguish clearly between them. What constitutes inauthenticity is not so understanding things simply as such, but doing so out of one's underlying anxiety and need for acceptance as though this were the only or the authentic way of understanding them. Thus if I use either science or metaphysics as part of my project as a self who understands himself inauthentically, then, but _only_ then, they, too, become inauthentic -- and, I might add, "_unsachlich_ \[unrealistic\]" (dcf. _GV_ 2: 39, 53). But to speak of them as inauthentic simply in themselves is, by implication, to deny the doctrine of creation -- or to confuse creation with _fallen_ creation. This means, among other things, that, although there is indeed a "dialectical" relation between understanding things in their structure in themselves and understanding them in their meaning for us, there is no such relation -- as Bultmann seems
 to say there is -- between properly "inauthentic" and Itauthentic"authentic" modes of
 understanding.