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The different things Bultmann says about "the need for acceptance \[_das GeltungsbediirfnisGeltungsbedürfnis_\]" are not as clear and consistent as they might be.

In some places -- notably in the essay, "_Christus des Gesetzes Ende_" (_GV_ 2: 32-58) -- he talks about it throughout as though it were a need only of "the natural man," i.e., one who, having always already refused to live solely by God's grace, is anxious lest her or his life slip away without meaning anything, and so undertakes to secure its meaning by her or his accomplishments. On this understanding, the need for acceptance would not be present and effective if one had trusted unreservedly in God, thereby accepting God's unconditional acceptance. Thus when Bultmann speaks elsewhere of "the need for acceptance of the natural man _\[_{_}das GeltungsbediirfnisGeltungsbedürfnis_ _des natiirlichennat{_}{_}ü{_}{_}rlichen Menschen_\]" (e.g., _GV_ 3: 192), it doesn't occur to anyone oriented to this understanding to suppose that this is other than a redundancy, since no one other than the natural man would have such a need.

Elsewhere, however, -– notably in the essay, "Gnade und Freiheit" (GV 2:149-161) -– it becomes clear that this is not really what Bultmann means to say. Here "the need for acceptance" is treated -– in Heideggerian terms -– as an "existenzial," or "ontologisch," need, more or less like "Sorge," rather than as an "existenziell," or "ontisch," need peculiar to the natural man. Thus Bultmann says, "Das Geltungsbediirfnis ist als solches nichts Perverses, sondern dem Menschen, der mit anderen und vor anderen leben mujJ, angemessen. Aber es ist ein GrundmijJvers tiindn is, wenn er meint, seine Geltung erzwingen zu konnen, den Anspruch auf Geltung durch Leistung begriinden zu konnen, -– durch sein Werk und durch sein Sein. 1m Grunde des Geltungsbediirfnisses liegt das Wissen um das Angewiesensein auf das Urteil anderer, und auf die Abhiingigkeit von ihnen; letzlich das Wisen um eine dem Urteil aller anderen Menschen iiberlegenen Instanz, um Gott. Aber dieses Wissen wird pervertiert, wenn der Mensch die Geltung erzwingen will, wenn er einen durch eigene Leistung begriindeten Anspruch auf sie erhebt, wenn er nicht versteht, dajJ sie ihm nur geschenkt werden, dajJ er in Wahrheit nur aus Gnade leben kann" (152 f.). Clearly, on this understanding, Bultmann's talk of "the need for acceptance of the natural man" is not redundant, but a significant, carefully distinguishing formulation.
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As for the "knowledge" that he says lies at the bottom of the need for acceptance, isn't it just what he has in mind when he cites Augustine's "Tu nos fecisti ad te, et cor nostrum inquietum est, donee requieseat in te" ?
1 December 2001