By Schubert Ogden
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But Jesus also need not be understood otherwise, since there is the obvious alternative of thinking and speaking of him with Rahner and others as the primal Christian sacrament. By 'sacrament' here, of course, I mean what is better referred to more generally as 'means of salvation' (IF NOT, MORE FORMALLY, AS 'MEANS OF ULTIMATE TRANSFORMATION'). In my view, ( ] sacraments in the ordinary sense are rightly thought of together with word as equivalent SUCH MEANS in that they are equally valid ways of REPRESENTING Jesus Christ as the explicit gift and demand of God's love. Thus it would be equally appropriate to develop an analogy between the word of preaching and Jesus and to think and speak of him, accordingly, as the primal Christian word, rather than as the primal Christian sacrament. In either case, the point of the analogy would be to assert both the similarity and the difference between ALL ordinary means of salvation and Jesus Christ. Like both word and sacraments, he does not constitute God's love, but RE-PRESENTS it. But whereas they RE-PRESENT God's love by also RE-PRESENTING him, he RE-PRESENTS God's love by also constituting them. Because this analogy is undoubtedly available, however, there is no need to think and speak of Jesus merely as prophet, sage, or saint. On the contrary, one can very well think and speak of him as savior, in the precise sense that, being the primal Christian word and sacrament, HE HAS THE UNIQUE SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE SPECIFICALLY CHRISTIAN RELIGION AND ECONOMY OF SALVATION THAT HE IS NOT MERELY REPRESENTATIVE BUT CONSTITUTIVE OF IT. |
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But I also argue there that "the term 'religion' by its very meaning always has an objective as well as a subjective reference – -- analogously to the way in which, on a traditional theological analysis, the term 'faith' refers to the 'faith which is believed' (fides quae creditur) as well as to the 'faith through which (it) is believed' (fides qua creditur)" (10). In fact, the way I argue this second point betrays my assumption that it somehow follows from the first. (Note the "Thus" connecting what I say about the two points.) Perhaps it does. But, as I now think about it, it seems rather to note yet a further characteristic of religion, that, in addition to essentially involving particular concepts and symbols as well as the explicit understanding of our existence that they serve to mediate, religion is constituted, in its objective sense, by just such an explicit understanding, and, in its subjective sense, by understanding oneself accordingly.
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