Page History

...

Question: what, exactly, is the relation between Luther's concept-term, "the _power \[vis\]_ of the fact," and Bultmann's concept-term, "the _significance \[die Bedeutung\]_ of the empirical-historical event"? It seems possible that they could be simply two ways of thinking-speaking about the same thing. On the other hand, recognizing (1) that, for Luther, "the _power_ of the fact" seems to be strictly correlated with "the _use_ of the fact" _by faith_; and (2) that, for Bultmann, _understanding_ the existential significance of the empirical-historical event is one thing, whereas _faith_ in the sense of positively appropriating that significance for oneself is something else \-\- recognizing this difference, one may well feel the need for a more nuanced answer.

...

According to Gogarten, when Luther speaks of the usus facti, as distinct from the factum, he has two things in mind: first, the intention with which the factum is done; and second, the acceptance of the factum that corresponds to this intention, which is possible only as faith. The intention, in turn, is to be found nowhere else than in the word, without which such an occurrence never occurs; and the appropriation of the occurrence takes place in the faith in the word with which a human being answers to the intention (Luthers Theologie: 77).

...

Allowing, then, that the christology of witness in all its formulations, implicit as well as explicit, properly has to do with the thing or fact of Jesus, but only as used in this way, one may say that the "power" it functions to attribute to Jesus is the power, or "significance," he has if, and only if, he is so used. Thus, just as the christology of witness indicates how Jesus is to be used in order to have this power – -- namely, existentially (in its formal aspect) and as God's liberating judgment of the world and thus also of me myself (in its material aspect) – -- so the faith that responds to this christology of witness by obediently accepting it uses Jesus accordingly, thereby releasing this very power.

...

It is one question whether or not assertions made on the basis of fides apprehensiva could be true, even while assumptions made on the basis of fides historica were false. But it is another, and different, question whether or not assertions made on the basis of fides apprehensiva could be true, even though presuppositions necessarily made in making them, and also any other assertions, or kinds of assertions, about the same subject, were false. The christological assertion about Jesus, as much as any other assertion or assumption about him, evidently presupposes that its subject term is the proper name of an individual in the past about whom, as about any historical figure, this as well as presumably other assertions, and other kinds of assertions, can be meaningfully and truly (if also falsely) made. But, then, the truth of the presupposition that the proper name "Jesus" functions to pick out just such an individual is clearly a necessary condition of the possibility of the christological assertion itself being true – -- or, for that matter, even being meaningful. Were there no historical figure that its subject term succeeds in picking out, the christological assertion could no more be true, or even meaningful, than any other assertion about Jesus of whatever kind, such as that he was a male human being, ethnically and religiously a Jew, the son of one Joseph of Nazareth, a rabbi among rabbis, an apocalyptic prophet once affiliated with John the Baptist, then the head of a messianic movement of his own, summarily executed by the Romans, and so on.

On the other hand, all such assertions of a clearly empirical-historical kind could be either true or false without in any way affecting the truth or falsity of the christological assertion, which being of a different logical kind – -- specifically, an existential-historical kind – -- has a correspondingly different kind of truth conditions. And this is so even in the case of formulations of the christological assertion that are expressed inapproprately in terms that, logically considered, can only be classified as empirical-historical, rather than existential-historical – -- which, of course, is exactly the defining characteristic of any properly mythical, or mythological, formulation. Although the meaning of any such formulation is existential, or existential-historical, the terms in which its meaning is expressed are – -- again, logically considered, by reference to their "deep strucure," as distinct from their "surface meaning" – -- empirical, or empirical-historical, terms.

Because this is so, however, something like Luther's distinction between fides histonca and fides apprehensiva may very well be said to be the sufficient as well as the necessary condition of distinguishing, as I do, between what may be assumed to be true empirical-historically in thinking and speaking about Jesus and what is asserted about him existential-historically in making or implying the constitutive christological assertion. Indeed, it is just my distinction that explains why Luther can say – -- rightly! – -- that fides historica is of "no help at all" – -- namely, because its truth or falsity is completely independent, logically, of the truth asserted on the basis of fides apprehensiva. On the other hand, we may be confident of Luther's agreeing unhesitatingly that what is assumed to be true, by Christians or anyone else, in thinking and speaking about Jesus necessarily presupposes that the subject term "Jesus" does indeed succeed in picking out a real historical figure, about whom it is possible to make assertions of logically different kinds that are meaningful whether or not they are also true. And Luther, too, would undoubtedly want to say that this same presupposition is therefore also necessarily made by Christians in claiming, as they do, that the christological assertion is not only appropriate but also true – -- although its truth, like its meaning, is logically different from that of any of the many things they may simply assume about Jesus in asserting the one thing about him that they, as Christians, are given and called to assert.

A final word: The difference discussed here – -- between the logically different kinds of things that may be assumed or asserted about Jesus, truly or falsely, on the basis of the same necessary presupposition – -- is not the only important difference between fides historica and fides apprehensiva. No less important certainly, from Luther's standpoint – -- is the difference between faith as a merely intellectual matter of holding certain things to be true and faith as an eminently existential matter of laying hold of a word of promise, understanding oneself and leading one's life accordingly, in obedient trust and fidelity. But, clearly, taking account of this difference in no way affects the validity of the account I have given of the other difference, any more than proceeding in the reverse direction would do so. Analysis requires that both differences be accounted for if Luther's distinction between fides historica and fides apprehensiva is to be correctly understood.

21 April 2010

                                                                                               Fides Historica, etc.

To what extent could one say that Luther's distinction between fides historica and fides apprehensiva (cf. Gogarten: 75 f.) is the sufficient as well as the necessary condition of my distinguishing between assuming to be true and asserting to be true?

That it is at least the necessary condition of my distinction seems clear enough, as comes out in Luther's closely related distinction between the _res_ or _factum_, on the one hand, and the _usus / vis rei_ or _usus / vis facti_, on the other \-\- this being just the distinction of which I make use when I argue that "the way it \[_sc_. the witness of the New Testament\] takes the fact of Jesus" is "not with reference to the empirical-historical question, 'What actually happened?' but rather with reference to the existential-historical question, 'What is the significance of what happened (or is assumed to have happened) for human existence?'"

But it seems clear that Luther does not explicitly say, and presumably _would_ not explicitly say, that assertions made on the basis of the _fides apprehensiva_ could be true even though the assumptions made by the _fides historica_ were false. At the same time, one could argue that he definitely implies just this when he says, "_das hilft nichts_ \[_sic_ \!\]" if one "_glaubt, diese Historie sei wahr, wie sie lautet_, ... _weil aIle Sunder, auch die Verdammten das glauben_" (75). Surely, if it is _of no help at all_ to believe that the history is true, since even the damned do that, it's hard to see how believing the truth of the history could even be a necessary condition of Christian faith.

...