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"In the comparison of diverse faiths, reason asks us to be technically neutral; that is to say, whatever may be the particular form of faith we happen to incline to, we ought to reason as if we had no such inclination. It is obvious that nothing is humanly more difficult than to achieve such neutrality of reasoning. Here \-\- as \[Reinhold\] Niebuhr points out \-\- is a mighty ambiguity in the term 'reason.' It means one thing so far as it designates an ideal of thinking, and something more or less radically different so far as it stands for this or that \[woman's or\] man's practice of thinking. The ideal neutrality which reason calls for is only an ideal so far as \[human beings are\] concerned. \[They try\] to play fair as between the faith \[they\] would like to justify and rival faiths, but scarcely can \[they\] ever wholly succeed. Here is the element of truth in the disparagement of reason often expressed by \[women and\] men of faith. What we actually have is not reason, but various alleged reasonings. . . . But granted all this, are not the \[women and\] men of faith in the same human boat along with the rest of us? If they renounce reason in favor of resting content with their own form of faith, on what ground do they claim validity for this form? If they say, we have received it directly or indirectly from God \[Godself\] who cannot deceive or be in error, the question is, by what mode of human response to a divine message could the possibility of error be ruled out? . . . The message is divine, but we miserable human wretches must receive and interpret it if it is to become our own living faith.