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What, then, are the "material predications" which need to be distinguished from "these invariant conditions of discourse"? Hartshorne's argument suggests they are either "symbolic" or "analogical" predications, which can themselves be distinguished only in dependence upon "one's
philosophical beliefs." Against this background, one can make sense of two statements of Hartshorne's which, on the face of it, are contradictory: (1) "If metaphysics knows anything, it must either know God, or know that the idea of God is meaningless. Neutrality as to God means no metaphysics. The choice is a theistic metaphysics, or an atheistic metaphysics or a positivistic rejection of both God and metaphysics." (2) "Hence the alternative to panpsychic idealism is not materialism or dualism, but agnosticism or positivism. The alternative is epistemological or methodological, not ontological. Ontology . . . is idealistic (in the panpsychic or realistic form) or nothing" (RST, 176, 84). In the former statement, Hartshorne is
speaking from the standpoint which recognizes that the issue of metaphysics is, in the most formal sense, twofold: (1) Are there any "invariant conditions of discourse" or "purely formal conceptions" such as positivism, however self-contradictorally, denies in rejecting metaphysics? and (2) What "philosophical beliefs" (theistic or atheistic) best explicate the content or "material" meaning, in the sense of the analogical meaning, of these "purely formal concepts"? In the latter statement, Hartshorne is speaking from the standpoint of his own "philosophical beliefs" that panpsychism alone enables one to understand the "invariant conditions of discourse" as more than "purely formal conceptions" – -- the only alternative being the "epistemological or methodological" denial that there even are such "invariant conditions."

Also intelligible from this, perhaps, are the rights and the limits of Gareth's effort to provide "a methodical-systematic laying of the foundations" of metaphysics. Such an effort is right insofar as it deals with the first of the two issues that metaphysics involves – -- namely, whether there are any "invariant conditions of discourse" or "purely formal conceptions" such as positivism denies. (Significantly, Goreth's style of reasoning is principally "self-refutation," i.e., he tries to show that the denial of metaphysics is "absolutely self-refuting" because it requires one to presuppose the very things it denies.) On the other hand, the limits of Gareth's reasoning lie in the treatment he gives to the second issue of how the conditions of our discourse are to be materially explicated.

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