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In one and the same essay, Hartshorne can take two contradictory positions on the scope of our immediate experience of, or direct acquaintance with, reality. Thus he can say in one sentence, "Memory in the generalized sense, common to personal and impersonal memory, is the whole of our direct acquaintance with reality." In another sentence, however, he can say, "In experience it is memory \[_{+}sc{+}_. personal memory\], perception \[_{+}sc{+}_. impersonal memory\], and goal seeking that tie events together" ("The Organism according to Process Philosophy": 143, 151 cf. CIAP: 201). Clearly, if the first sentence were correct, the second could only be false \-\- and vice versa. Since Hartshorne is elsewhere clear that we have a direct acquaintance with, or experience of, the future no less than the past, it is evidently the second sentence that more adequately expresses what he means to say. The interesting question, then, is why he is led to say what he says in the first.