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- that, if "reality" and its cognates can and must be used in all the literally different senses reflecting the logical-ontological type-differences, then even in a transcendental metaphysics it can only be a broadly "analogical" concept-term, in that it can and must be used in different, if also similar, senses to refer to all the different logical-ontological types of reality;
- that even properly symbolic or metaphorical uses of language based in our empirical experience can be said to be "analogical" in a broad sense, just as, conversely, so-called analogical concepts-terms based in our existential experience are, for all that, still properly said to be symbolic or metaphorical; but
- that the distinction between these two senses in which"analogy" is to be accepted as unavoidable even in a transcendental metaphysics and the sense in which it is to be rejected is perfectly clear-cut, in that the different senses in which properly transcendental concepts-terms are used are each literal or univocal, because (1) they each apply within their respective types, not in different senses, but in the same sense; and (2) they each have a strictly literal or univocal core of meaning in any of their different uses-so that, e.g., anything that is real in any sense whatever is so only because it is real for, and hence makes a difference to, something else that is in process of becoming real in the same general sense; and any individual whatever, whether the extraordinary, because universal individual God or any ordinary, because particular individual other than God, actualizes its individuality and so exists--whether extraordinary or ordinary--
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- only in events that are and must be contingent rather than necessary.
But even if the substance of the needed clarification has, to this extent, already been worked out, I still have to see to it that it is clearly understood---lest my polemic against "analogy" and "categorial metaphysics" fail to carry the strictly logical point that alone justifies it.
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