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Thus we have the traditional statements that God "transcends the categories," which cannot be applied "univocally" to God, and that God "does not have but is God's being or goodness." In other words, the nature of God is not a universal property capable of being embodied in this, that, or the other individual. On the contrary, the unique excellence of God necessarily implies a logical-ontological type difference from all other individuals, actual or possible. 

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On the other hand, "\[a\] sole example is not a supreme example.... We do not exalt God by giving \[God\] a unique category, like creative power, for \[God's\] very own.... The unsurpassable power of God should be the supreme form of 'power' in the general sense, exhibited elsewhere in inferior degrees or 'resemblances'" (195; d. 67). II"\[T\]he supreme must not be the sole form of a category" (196). 
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Thus we must say such things as, _IIGod_"God _has the supreme form of LTeativitycreativity, creatures have lesser forms" (197). "\[I\]f supreme reality consists in supreme creativity ... , then lesser realities must be lesser---but not zero---forms of such creativity" (207). God's is not the sole creativity, but rather lithe"the selfsurpassable, otherwise unsurpassable Creativity" (218). _
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13 October 2004