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_But, surely, if Hartshorne's right that any concrete whatever, even a physical particle, is and must be at least "sentient," one may well question whether Santayana ever says or implies any thing to indicate that he means by "animal faith" what Hartshorne says he means by it. Moreover, would Hartshorne himself really want to use "animal faith" in such all utterly general sense? Or has he tacitly slipped back into using "sentient" in its ordinary sense to mean simply "animal," or "animate"?_{_}-\-_-{_}{-_}Note his terminology: "the great religious faiths" and "the various attempted philosophical substitutes for these," i.e., philosophical faiths (163); "diverse faiths"; "particular form\[s\] of faith"; "the various faiths"; "faith, or life-trust" (165f; 171.).\-_\--As for his talk about the "ideal" of a certain form of behavior, I wonder whether it's more than verbally different from talking, as I'm accustomed to do, about a normative understanding of a certain form of behavior. I don't see why one couldn't say equally appropriately, for instance, that the ideal _of doing theology is to appropriate witness critically by critically interpreting its meaning and critically validating its claims to 'validity and that doing just this is what it is to do theology,_ normatively understood.