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I too often proceed as though there were only two main kinds of science, strictly and properly so-called, whereas in reality there are three:

(1) the kind represented by the empirical sciences, human (or social) as well as natural;

(2) the kind represented by the axiomatic sciences of logic and mathematics; and

(3) the kind uniquely represented by metaphysics (i.e., transcendental metaphysics in the broad sense inclusive of existentialist analysis as well as transcendental metaphysics sensu stricto).

Each of these kinds of science corresponds to some mode of (logical) modality, each of which in turn corresponds to some mode of (ontological) time or process: the actual (including the existent); the possible; and intellectual question rather than any existential question; i.e., they abstract completely from any concern with meaning for us to attend entirely to structure in itself-whether that of actuality, or possibility, or necessity. rev. 28 November 2005

(1) the kind represented by

(2) the kind represented by

(3) the kind uniquely represented by

(1) the kind represented by the empirical sciences corresponding to the actual (including the existent);(1) the kind represented by the empirical sciences corresponding to

(2) the kind represented by the axiomatic sciences corresponding to the possible; and

(3) the kind represented by metaphysics corresponding to the necessary.

But all kinds of science are alike in that, as kinds of science, strictly and properly so-called, the vital question by which they are constituted is some intellectual question rather than any existential question; i.e., they abstract completely from any concern with meaning for us to attend entirely to structure in itself---whether that of actuality, or possibility, or necessity.

3 October 2002; rev. 28 November 2005