By Schubert Ogden
...
"The concrete more" in concrete things from which the formulce formulæ of mathematical physics abstract is some form or other of the same principle of which human experience is the only form clearly given in our experience. The question, however, remains, and must remain, open whether, or to what extent, any of the other forms of the principle, to say nothing of the principle itself, can and should be described by the word "experience." Psychicalism, properly so-called, simply begs this question.
The only proper way to conceive "the concrete more" of beings other than ourselves -– so far, at least,as metaphysics is concerned -– is as exemplifying or instantiating the same purely formal structure of concreteness as such that is the necessary condition of the possibility of our own being as experiencing, indeed, knowing, willing, loving beings. Our being as such, as existing understandingly, and so emphatically, or to the second power, is given simply as a special case, example, or instance, however privileged, of this formal structure. Moreover, anything else that we could conceive as concrete could only be yet another special case, example, or instance of this structure. In this sense, we (nay may agree with psychicalism that "the concrete more that the mathematics leaves out" is "neither mere matter, whatever that could be, nor our human experiences, but a vast variety of forms taken by a principle of which human experience is only one extremely special form" (Hartshorne).
The only proper way to conceive "the concrete more" of beings other than ourselves-so far, at least,as metaphysics is concerned-is as exemplifying or instantiating the same purely formal structure of concreteness as such that is the necessary condition of the possibility of our own being as experiencing, indeed, knowing, willing, loving beings. Our being as such, as existing understandingly, and so emphatically, or to the second power, is given simply as a special case, example, or instance, however privileged, of this formal structure. Moreover, anything else that we could conceive as concrete could only be yet another special case, example, or instance of this structure. In this sense, we (nay agree with psychicalism that "the concrete more that the mathematics leaves out" is "neither mere matter, whatever that could be, nor our human experiences, but a vast variety of forms taken by a principle of which human experience is only one extremely special form" (Hartshorne).
But if we are to avoid begging the question, as distinct from answering it, we dare not go on to say with the psychicalist, "This principle is experience as such or in general, experience whether human, subhuman, even subanimal, and perhaps also superhuman." On the contrary, all we can do is alter the original sentence to read after "human experience," and, for all we know or possibly can know, any form of experience is but a special case.
I take it that this position is, in all essentials, the position Hartshorne criticizes as the "nonpsychicalist" position held by Bertrand Russell as wen well as Wilfrid Sellers (and before him his father, Roy Wood Sellers and his colleague, DeWitt Parker). Cf. ClAP: 240-244.
8 March 2006; rev. 16 October 2009