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An instructive example of proceeding in these two ways is offered in effect by lvor Leclerc in _Whitehead's_ _Metaphysics._ Leclerc argues that Whitehead entirely agrees with Aristotle in understanding metaphysics as the attempt to conceive "a complete fact," or "a complete existence." "By 'a complete fact' Whitehead means precisely what Aristotle meant by the _that_ which _i{_}{_}s_ in this sense.'" Thus, "\[ w \]hen Whitehead says the problem \[_sc._ of metaphysics \] is 'to conceive a complete fact' he means thereby what Aristotle meant in declaring the problem to be: 'what that is which _is_ in this sense \[_sc._ in the sense of _οúσíα_\]'..." (17 f.). But, of course, as Leclerc goes on to show at great length in the rest of his book, Whitehead's _solution_ to the problem significantly differs from Aristotle's precisely because he takes "a complete fact," or a 'fully existent' entity," to be "an actual entity," as distinct from "a particular and actually existing thing," which is to say, an enduring individual that Aristotle take  _οúσíα\_ properly to refer to. So whether Leclerc ever makes my distinction between "formal" and "material" -- and I have not confirmed that he does -- he certainly employs it, or something very like it, in arguing for his understanding of Whitehead's relation to "the great philosophical tradition."