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2.  But  this  is  in  no  way  to  say  that  there  is  not  a  difference  within  any given  field  between  what  is  real  and  what  is  not.  For  if what  is  real,  given some  mode  of  reasoning,  some  way  of  taking  account  of  things  that  we  are  in one  way  or  another  obliged  to  take  account  of,  is,  indeed,  relative  to  this mode  of  reasoning,  this  way  of  taking  account  of  things,  it is  not  in  the  least relative  to  any  particular  conclusion  arrived  at within  this  mode  of  reasoning or  way  of  taking  account  of  things.  In  other  words,  there  remains  the  distinc­tion  between  what  is  believed  to  be  true,  given  this  mode  of  reasoning,  and what  is  worthy  of  being  believed  true, given  the  standards  established  by  this same  mode  of  reasoning.  In  this  sense,  one  could  say  that  the  distinction between  "being-in-itse.lfitself"  and  "meaning-for-us"  is  both  pertinent  and  important, insofar  as  it expresses,  or  is  taken  to  express,  that  what  is  worthy  of  being believed  is  one  thing,  what  in  fact  is  believed,  something  irreducibly  different. 

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4.  But  this  still  leaves  open  the  question  of  the  mode  of  reasoning,  or  way of  taking  account  of  things  that  must  somehow  be  taken  account  of  within  which religious  utterances  are  either  true  or  false.  The  answer  to  this  question can  be  given  only  by  rightly  locating  the  religious  mode  of  reasoning,  or  way of  taking  account  of  reality,  relative  to  the  metaphysical  mode  of  reasoning, on  the  one  hand,  and  the  moral  mode  of  reasoning,  on  the  other.  (I  can't see my  way  clear  to  doing  this  rightly  here.  The  essential  point  is  that,  while the  religious  mode  of  reasoning  overlaps,  and  hence  necessarily  presupposes both  the  metaphysical  and  the  moral  modes,  religious  utterances  nevertheless are  neither  properly  metaphysical  nor  properly  moral.  This  means,  among  other things,  that  religious  utterances  as  such -as  distinct  from  the  metaphysical and  moral  assertions  they  necessarily  imply-claim as distinct from the metaphysical and moral assertions they necessarily implyclaim  to  be  expressions  of  the authentic  self-understanding  whose  possibility  is  implied  both  by  a  true  meta­physics  and and  a  just morality. Thus,  while  they  make  or  imply  claims  about self,  others,  and  the  whole,  they  do  so  only  as  authorizing--giving  and  de­manding demanding--the  self-understanding  that  they  also  express.  So  far  as  the  reli­gious  mode  of  reasoning  as  such  is  concerned,  then,  "God"  in  its  proper proper  theis­tic,  as  distinct  from  its  broader,  religious,  meaning  refers  to  the  universal individual  as  authorizing  a  self-understanding  of  radical  trust  and  radical loyalty.  To  affirm,  accordingly,  "I  believe  in  God,"  is  to  affirm  not  only that  one  in  fact  does  believe  in  God  but  also  that  one  in  principle  ought  to believe  in  God  even  if one  does  not  in  fact  do  so,  because  God  gives  and  de­mands  just such  faith.  By  comparison,  then,  with  the  way  in  which  metaphys­ics  takes  account  of  God,  one  could  say,  quite  understandably,  religious  ut­terances  have  to  do  with  the  meaning-of-God-for-us,  not  with  the  being-of-God­in-itself.  But  this  would  neither  imply  the  illegitimacy  in  principle  of metaphysical  talk  about  God  (on  the  ground  that  it mistakenly  tries  to  over­come  the  systematic  ambiguity  of  IIreal,.'  etc.) nor collapse  the  crucial  distinc­tion  between  what  is  believed  and  what  is  worthy  of  belief.  It would  simply make  clear  the  important  difference  between  religion  and  metaphysics.  And  so, too,  one  could  show,  with  the  no  less  important  difference  between  the  reli­gious  mode  of  reasoning  and  the  moral. 

5. An  analogy  may  be  useful.  The  criteria  appropriate  for  common  sense  talk about  what  is  real  allows  one  to  say  of  the  sun  at sunset  that  it is  "really red."  To  deny  that  such  talk  is  about  the  real,  on  the  ground  that  yet  other criteria-those  of  the  physicist,  say-require  other criteria require  one  to  say  that  the  sun  at  sun­set  is  "really  yellow"  is  simply  to  shift  the  discussion  to  another  mode  of reasoning.  What  the  religious  mode  of  reasoning  means  by  ultimate  reality  is what  confronts  us  with  the  possibility  of  authentic  self-understanding.  To deny  that  the  talk  involved  in  the  religious  mode  of  reasoning  is  about  the real,  on  the  ground  that  yet  other  criteria-those of the metaphysician, say, ­require  one  to  say  that  ultimate  reality  is  the  universal  individual  that  is the  ground  and  end  of  all  other  individuals  and  events,  etc.,  is,  again,  sim­ply  to  shift  the  discussion  to another  mode  of  reasoning.

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